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POST-INCORPORATION LEGAL PROBLEMS OF
AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES
Although agricultural cooperatives have most of the usual legal
problems facing noncooperative business entities engaged in the same
field, certain problems are peculiar to them. The special areas which
have received the greatest attention in recent months appear to be
income taxation of cooperative retains and antitrust litigation. This
article will attempt to give the nonspecialized attorney a working
knowledge of the problems in these areas and, perhaps, provide him
with some suggestionsfor avoiding or alleviatingthose problems.
I.

The Farmer, the Cooperative, and the Commissioner
By JomH

B. CNi~moN*

ELEVEN years ago one of the co-authors wrote an article for this
Journal bearing the same title as this section.1 In the intervening
years the relationship of the patron to his cooperative and of both to
the Internal Revenue Service has so changed that the only remaining
similarity between the earlier article and the present one seems to be
the title. In 1962 Congress clarified the taxability of patronage dividends with the enactment of subchapter T of the Internal Revenue
Code. 2 Three years later, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue attempted to clarify the taxability of per-unit retains 3 with the issuance
of new regulations. 4 Shortly thereafter, Congress again defined its position and proceeded to amend subchapter T to effect a similarity of
tax treatment of both the patronage dividends and per-unit retains.5
The approach is to provide for a single tax, generally at the patron
level, but under certain circumstances, upon the cooperative itself at
regular corporate income tax rates. 6
* Member, California and Arizona Bars; admitted to practice as Certified
Public Accountant in California and Arizona.
1 Couper, The Farmer, the Cooperative, and the Commissioner, 7 HAsTINGS L.J. 143 (1956).

§§ 1381-88.
3 A per-unit retain is a retain the amount of which is fixed by agree2 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,

ment without reference to the net earnings of the organization, e.g., one cent
per pound of almonds marketed. See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1388(f).
4 Treas. Reg. §§ 1.61-5(d),

(e),

(f),

(g), (h), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum.

BuLL. 21-24; Treas. Reg. § 1.521-1(f), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 24.
G 80 Stat. 1582 (1966), amending INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1381, 1382,

6044.
0 Mischler & Volkin, How the Revenue Act of 1962 Affects Farmer Co-

1383, 1385, 1388,

operatives, U.S. DEP'T OF AGPicuLTuRE FARmER CooPEIRTmV
[3231

SERvicE GENERAL
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The original version of subchapter T is now 6 years old, and has
been discussed in detail elsewhere.7 The emphasis herein will be on
the taxation of per-unit retains or in the parlance of the Code, "perunit retain certificates." Since Congress acted within a few months
of the promulgation of the Commissioner's regulations, one would
think that the Code would prevail and that cooperative managers and
advisors could forget about the controversial regulations.9 However,
one writer tells us that the 1966 Code amendments are in accord with
the earlier regulations;' 0 and the Senate Committee takes no position
at all, stating that it does not intend to reflect upon the validity of the
regulations."
Because of this uncertainty, and because revenue agents may
attempt to apply the regulations, an understanding of the key provisions and of the problems which they raise is essential.
Treasury Regulations Issued October 1965 Under Sections

6112

and

52113 of the Internal Revenue Code

Subchapter T 14 only dealt with distributions out of net earnings
of the cooperative, 1 therefore the taxability of amounts retained on
a per-unit-marketed or per-unit-delivered basis continued to be unclear. To cure this apparent oversight the regulations, in effect, say
that unless the cooperative obtains an agreement from its patron to
REPORT No. 105 (1962); CALIFoRNiA FARMVi
Educ. Bar ed. 1967).

AND RANCH LAW

482-91 (Cal.

Cont.

7 E.g., Logan, Federal Income Taxation of Farmers and Other Cooperatives, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 250 (1965); Clark & Warlich, Taxation of Cooperatives:
A Problem Solved?, 47 MN.

L. REv. 997 (1963); Joplin, Taxation of CooperTEXAS L. REV. 908 (1963).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(g), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 24, defines the
term "per-unit retain certificate," which is a new word of art to both the tax
law and to cooperation. It includes any document issued with respect to products marketed for the patron which discloses the dollar amount allocated to
the patron on the books of the cooperative without respect to its net earnings.
9 This seemed to be the suggestion of one authority who announced that
the Code now conforms to the regulations. CALiFoRNIA FARM AND RANCH LAw,
supra note 6, at 490.
10 Volkin & Neely, Tax Laws Changed on Capital Retains, NEWS FOR
FARMER COOPERATIVES, March 1967, at 3.
11 S.REP. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1966).
12 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 61 is the basic provision which states that
gross income means all income from whatever source derived; it also lists
several illustrative examples of such income. In explaining this section, the
Commissioner has issued numerous regulations and rulings, including the 1965
per-unit retain regulations. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5, T.D. 6855, 1965-2
Cum. BULL. 21.
13 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 521 is the section which exempts farmer cooperatives from taxation except as provided in subchapter T (INT. REV.
CODE OF 1954, §§ 1381-88).
14 INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, §§ 1381-88.
15 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 1382(a), (b).

atives Under the 1962 Revenue Act, 41
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include the amount of his per-unit retains in his taxable income, the
cooperative will pay the tax itself. 16
The regulations now provide 17 that a cooperative shall treat as a
distribution to its patron (i.e., exclude from its income or increase its
cost of sales) the face amount of any "per-unit retain certificate"'
issued with respect to products marketed for a patron if that patron
"qualifies" by agreeing to include the amount of the certificate in his
income. Issuance of a certificate to a nonqualifying patron does not
reduce the cooperative income, but the subsequent redemption of it
19
will.
The agreement needed for qualification may be either a written
consent signed by the individual patron or mere membership in a
cooperative whose bylaws contain a consent provision.20 Regarding
this second alternative, if a court determines that the bylaw provision
does not bind the patron to include the amount of his retain certificate
in his income, the amount is "rolled-back" into the cooperative's income.2 1 Laboring under the uncertainty of this delayed action provicooperatives to use the written consent
sion, most advisors urged
22
method of qualifying.
A cooperative without qualifying patrons may exclude from its
income only the market value (not necessarily the face amount) of
per-unit retain certificates issued to its patrons. 23 The market value is
considered to be zero where the cooperative rather than the patron
controls the conditions regarding redemption of the certificate. 24 The
qualifying or consenting patron must include the amount of the retain
certificate in his income,25 and the nonqualifying patron is required
to include in his income any money received in redemption of his
retain certificate. 26
The new regulations apply to retain certificates "issued by a cooperative association during taxable years . . .beginning after April
30, 1966, with respect to products marketed for patrons during such
years. 27
16 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(d), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL. 22.

17 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(d) (1)(i), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BuLL.22.
IsFor a definition of "per-unit retain certificate," see note 8 supra.
'9 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(d) (1)(ii), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 22.
20 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(d) (2) (i), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 22.
21 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(d) (2) (ii), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 22.
22

Neely, Current Legal Developments Affecting Farmer Cooperatives,

1966 AmcAN CooPERATIVE 181; Mather, Per Unit Retain Regulations-A New
Course to Chart, CoopEaRAnv ACCOUNTANT, Summer 1966, at 3; Wile, Taxation of Farmer's Cooperatives and Their Patrons, 1966 S. CAL. TAx INST. 449.
23 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(e), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 23.
24

Id.

25 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(f) (1)(i), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 23.
26 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(f) (1) (ii), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum. BULL. 23.
27 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(h), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cur. BULL. 24; see the dis-
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Regulation 1.521-1(f) was also amended 28 to provide that a cooperative's tax-exempt status will not be affected by treating nonqualifying patrons to whom it has issued per-unit retain certificates in the
same manner as it is permitted to treat nonconsenting patrons who
receive patronage dividend notice of allocation.

1966 Amendments to Federal Income Tax Law
Regarding Per-Unit Retains
If the 1965 treasury regulations were unnecessary, 29 imperfect,
based upon a lack of knowledge of cooperative operations, litigationbreeding, and the cause of uncertainty, 30 the Code amendments are
unquestionably a vast improvement.
Although the amendments to subchapter T do not postpone taxation of per-unit retains until redemption, as urged by the cooperatives, 31 Congress, having the benefit of considerable discussion by representatives of cooperatives, made several departures from the provisions in the regulations.
Significant improvements included the elimination of the "automatic roll-back" provision of the regulations,3 2 and clarification regarding the effective dates. The regulations apply the new tax treatment to per-unit retain certificates issued by a cooperative during tax
years beginning after April 30, 1966, with respect to products marketed
during such years. 33 The problem here is that the delivery and subsequent marketing of the products, the issuance of the certificate, and
the closing of the pool, where pooling arrangements are used, may
often spread over several years.3 4 Cooperative representatives, concerned over the indefiniteness of this provision feared that there
could be a mismatching of revenues and the related exclusion for
per-unit retain certificates issued.
The new law apparently overcomes this uncertainty by providing 3 5 that (1) the patronage is considered to occur during the taxable
year in which the pool closes, and (2) the marketing is considered to
occur during any of the taxable years in which the pool is open.
cussion of problems raised by this provision at text accompanying note 62

infra.

T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum.BuLL. 23.
Neely, supra note 22, at 183.
30 Mather, supra note 22, at 10.
31 The 1966 amendments incorporate the single tax theory already applied
to patronage dividends since 1962 and applied to retains in the regulations
for years beginning after April 30, 1966.
32 See text accompanying note 21 supra.
33 Treas. Reg. § 1.61-5(h), T.D. 6855, 1965-2 Cum.BULL. 24.
34 One author dramatizes this situation with an illustration of a wine
pool where the pool is closed (sold out) 6 years after delivery of the grapes
by the patron. Mather, supra note 22, at 8.
28
29

35 INT. REV. CODE oF 1954, § 1382(e).
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Under these provisions the cooperative is given discretion regarding
the year in which it desires to issue its certificate and recognize the
related exclusion or deduction.3"
The new law extends the annual income tax information reporting requirements regarding patronage dividends to per-unit retain
certificates. 37 As with most payors of income, farmer cooperatives
must now report to the Internal Revenue Service the face amount of
qualified per-unit retain certificates38issued or nonqualified certificates
redeemed during the calendar year.
The Code amendments incorporate the regulations' technique of
permitting the cooperative to exclude the amount of nonqualified perunit retain certificates only upon redemption. 39 Not until the year
of redemption must the patron receiving such certificate include the
redemption price in his income.40
A patron qualifies under the 1966 changes by agreeing in writing
or joining a cooperative with a new bylaw provision adopted after
November 13, 1966.41 There is a transitional rule for cooperatives
which adopted a new bylaw provision pursuant to the 1965 treasury
regulations. 42 A cooperative is well advised to adopt a new bylaw
provision or, if the individual written consent method is chosen, to obtain new consent before any patronage occurs.
Receni Income Tax Rulings Affecting Farmer Cooperatives
Section 521 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that a farmer
cooperative shall be exempt from taxation where the association is
operated on a cooperative basis for the purposes of marketing its members' produce or purchasing their supplies and equipment. Applying
this section, the Commissioner ruled that where a cooperative's only
activities were maintaining its members' orchards and harvesting
their crops, it did not qualify for exemption. Grove caretaking and
harvesting are farming activities, but do not involve the sale of proand therefore do not satisfy the requireduce or purchase of supplies,
43
ment for exemption.
It should be noted that the Internal Revenue Service has revised
30 For a summary of the new law, see Volkin & Neely, Tax Laws Changed
on Capital Retains, NEWS FOR FAEMER CooPmEs, March 1967, at 3; D.
NDED
TAX LAws AFFECTING COOPERATIVES AND
VomxIN & D. NEELY, THE Ai
THEIR PATRONS 17-18 (U.S. Dep't of Agriculture, Farmer Cooperative Service
Rep. No. 87, 1967).
37 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6044(b) (1) (c).
38 Id.
39 INT. REV. CODE or 1954, § 1382(b).
40 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1385(a).
41 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1388(h) (2).
42 Pub. L. No. 89-809, § 211(f), 80 Stat. 1539 (1966).
43 Rev. Rul. 66-108, 1966-1 CUM. BULL. 154.
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44
its application procedures for an exemption under section 521.
Also, it has ruled that an exemption may be lost through carelessness
in permitting nonproducers to obtain capital stock in the cooperative.
who has ceased producing to return the
Merely asking the recipient
45
sufficient.
not
is
certificate
Another unfavorable ruling dramatizes that good recordkeeping
is essential. 46 Before the Commissioner was a farmer cooperative
which did both marketing and purchasing. Its accounting records
(1) reflected gross marketing revenue and gross purchases, (2) provided no basis for allocation of patronage dividends, (3) provided no
detail of amounts of business done for individual patrons, and (4) did
not reflect the costs and expenses of the marketing and of the purchasing departments separately. The cooperative merely allocated
expenses to each department on the basis of departmental gross sales.
The Commissioner ruled that separate records for each department as
well as records of transactions with the patrons of each department
must be maintained to establish the fact that the cooperative operated
in the required manner. The cooperative, having failed 47to keep adequate books of account, was not exempt under section 521.

It is common for a marketing cooperative to purchase minor
amounts of produce on the open market to be used in processing or to
be added to their patrons' produce to create a more saleable consumer item. For example, fruit canning associations may purchase
pineapple and maraschino cherries for the canning of fruit cocktail.
It is also common for a cooperative to handle a relatively large volume
of business for nonmember prodcers, and so long as it treats these
producers on a nondiscriminatory basis regarding patronage dividends,
per-unit retains, and the like, the exemption is not jeopardized. But
what will be the result when more than half of the produce marketed
for members was purchased on the open market rather than grown
by them? Since the Code provides that products marketed for nonmembers must not exceed in value those of members,48 and since
products grown by a nonmember must be so treated even though
marketed by the cooperative in the name of a member, the exemption
is lost.49
Regarding a purchasing cooperative, the Code permits business
with nonmembers and nonproducers only to the extent it does not
exceed 15 percent of the value of all its purchases. 50 Recently the
Rev. Proc. 67-3, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 1, at 22.
Rev. Rul. 67-204, 1967 NT. REv. BULL. No. 26, at 9; see Co-operative
Grain & Supply Co., 26 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 593 (1967).
46 Rev. Rul. 67-253, 1967 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 33, at 13.
47 Id.
44
45

1954, § 521(b) (4).
49 Rev. Rul. 67-152, 1967 INT. REv. BULL. No. 19, at 12.
50 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 521(b) (4).
48 INT. REv. CODE OF
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Commissioner ruled that purchases for a member-producer used for
other than his farming business must be regarded as nonmember, nonproducer purchases, and could not exceed the 15 percent limit. 51 The
ruling gave as an example a farmer who also operated a trucking business and bought the gasoline for his trucks through the cooperative.
What happens where a nonexempt farmer cooperative markets
some of its patrons' produce to other producer patrons? Is the total
volume done by patrons in both capacities considered in the calculation of their allocation of patronage dividends? Citing a 1919 decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, the Commissioner ruled in the
negative, 52 because the patron acting as a purchaser of crops is not
dealing with the cooperative "on a cooperative basis" and is not a
"patron." Consequently, the cooperative lost the exclusion for dividends paid to such a purchaser.
A favorable ruling has recently been issued which is of considerable importance to many California cooperatives which maintain their
books and records to reflect departmental income and loss. Where
the association consistently allocates the net earnings, including nonpatronage gains and losses, of each department to the patrons of that
department on a proportionate nondiscriminatory basis, such allocation method is proper. 53 Also, where a cooperative seeks to reduce
its bookkeeping burden regarding the 20 percent payment requirement
for qualified written notices of allocation of patronage dividends, and
pays in full to those entitled to distributions of 10 dollars or less, this
practice will not adversely affect the exemption of the cooperative
54
under section 521.
Finally, the Internal Revenue Service announced in a procedural
release that it will not contest an association's treatment of per-unit
retains as an increase in its cost of goods sold for years beginning
prior to May 1, 1966. 55 If a cooperative had not treated its retains as
such a cost of sales in the year issued, it may take them into account
in the year of redemption."
Tax Problems Unsolved by Recent Legislation
Tax Consequences to Patron
With the change in the tax treatment regarding per-unit retains,
the possibility of a doubling-up of the patron's income tax exists. If
51 Rev. Rul. 67-223, 1967 IwT. REv. BuLL. No. 28, at 12.
Rev. Rul. 66-380, 1966-2 Cum. BULL. 359, citing McClure v. Cooperative Elevator & Supply Co., 105 Kan. 91, 181 P. 573 (1919).
53 Rev. Rul. 67-128, 1967 INT. REV. BULL. No. 17, at 10.
52

54 Rev. Rul. 66-152, 1966-1 Cum. BULL. 155.
55 Rev. Proc. 66-45, 1966 INT. REV. BULL. No. 42, at 80.
56 Id.
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the patron failed to include retains allocated to him in earlier years,
and these retains are redeemed after April 30, 1966, he is deemed to
have received taxable income. 57 If this same member is a qualifying
patron to whom a per-unit retain certificate is issued with respect
to current patronage, additional income must be reported. 58 This
situation potentially could strain the relationship between the cooperative and its patrons, the cooperative seeking to obtain the largest
available exclusion or deduction while the patron attempts to avoid as
far as possible, recognizing as taxable income, earnings which he does
not immediately receive in cash.
It is clear that a cooperative may itself be a patron or member in
another cooperative, 59 and within reason this "chain" could be extended to three or four or more cooperatives. Following its yearend,
each cooperative has 81 months to make its patronage dividend and
per-unit retain certificate allocation, as well as to redeem nonqualified
notice and retains.60 If each member in a multilayer cooperative
chain were to utilize the maximum 8
month payment period, it
can be seen that the individual patron could postpone significantly
the time of actual recognition as income and payment of tax.
Handling of Net OperatingLoss
In 1965, the Internal Revenue Service ruled that
the earnings of the cooperative available for payment of patronage
dividends, the payment of which is treated as a deduction under Section 1382(b) of the Code, are not affected by the net operating loss
deduction. Similarly, since 172 (b) (2) of the Code does not limit the
patronage dividends deduction in any way, the amount of patronage
dividends treated as a deduction is not required to be recomputed
for any year to which a net operating loss may be carried in determining, under that section, the portion of such loss that remains to
be carried to other taxable years.6 '
What was not answered is whether the cooperative may take the net
operating loss deduction, reduce its current income, and reduce the
amount of the patronage dividend (or per-unit retain) allocations
necessary to achieve the desired taxable income. If the cooperative
must still allocate all of its income before deducting the net operating
loss, it has effectively been deprived of the benefit of section 172.
Other Problems
Subchapter T, the regulations, and the 1966 amendments are silent
on many other questions. For example, may pre-1966 retain certifiSee INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1385(a).
58 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1385(a) (3).
59 CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 54233.
57

60 Treas. Reg. § 1.1382-4 (1963).
61 Rev. Rul. 65-106, 1965-1 Cumv. BULL. 126.
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cates be exchanged for capital stock in a stock cooperative? If so, is
the exchange tax-free? Is this in the nature of a corporate reorganization? When the exchanged-for stock is redeemed, is this a sale
of a capital asset? What is the tax effect of a reduction in the value
of pre-1966 revolving fund or capital retains? Is this a capital for
ordinary loss, or a reduction in basis?
Since the 1966 amendment talks only of "year in which such marketing occurs,"8' 2 what is the status of per-unit retains of purchasing
cooperatives?
There are no definite answers to these and many other questions.
It can only be hoped that the important contribution made by cooperative marketing and purchasing activities will not be overlooked in
an effort to fit these institutions into neat tax definitions developed
for profit corporations.
II.

Antitrust Problems of Cooperatives
By GEORGE E. COUPER*
T HE antitrust problems of agricultural cooperatives revolve around
the interpretation of two historical pieces of legislation. First, in
order of time, was section 6 of the Clayton Act.' It became law in
1914 after questions had arisen in state courts as to the propriety of
agricultural cooperatives and their practices.2 Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of
commerce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural,
or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual
help, and not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid
or restrain individual members of such organizations from lawfully
carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust
laws. 3

The Clayton Act exemption protected only the existence and operation of nonstock associations. Congress felt that this protection was4
not broad enough, and in 1922 enacted the Capper-Volstead Act,
62

See text accompanying note 27 supra.

Sacramento Bar.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
2 E.g., Reeves v. Decorah Farmer's Co-operative Soc'y, 160 Iowa 194, 140
N.W. 844 (1913); see Jensen, The Bill of Rights of U.S. Cooperative Agriculture, in CoopERAnv CoRPoRATE AssOCIATION LAw-1950, at 1 (1950).
3 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
4 Ch. 57, § 1, 42 Stat. 388 (1922).
*Member,

1
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which provides:
Persons engaged in the production of agricultural products as
farmers, planters, ranchmen, dairymen, nut or fruit growers may act
together in associations, corporate or otherwise, with or without capital stock, in collectively processing, preparing for market, handling,
and marketing in interstate and foreign commerce, such products of
persons so engaged. Such associations may have marketing agencies
in common; and such associations and their members may make the
necessary contracts and agreements to effect such purposes: provided
however, that such associations are operated for the mutual benefit of
the members thereof, as such producers, and conform to one or both
of the following requirements:
First. That no member of the association is allowed more than
one vote because of the amount of stock or membership capital he
may own therein, or,

Second. That the association does not pay dividends on stock or
membership capital in excess of eight per centum per annum.
And in any case to the following:
Third. That the association shall not deal in the products of
nonmembers to an amount greater in value than such as are handled
by it for members. 5
Debate has flourished for many years about the extent to which
the Capper-Volstead Act expanded the exemption from antitrust laws
provided in the Clayton Act. Certainly, Capper-Volstead extended
the exemption to certain cooperatives which issued capital stock in
addition to memberships. One court has commented, however, that
the Capper-Volstead Act adds nothing to the immunities and exemptions of section 6 of the Clayton Act except to extend them to corporations having capital stock and except to make the provisions of the
earlier statute more definite and specific.6
The Developing Case Law
The balance of this article will summarize the relevant cases, but
will not dissect, analyze or criticize them. At the conclusion will
appear a list of rules based on the current state of the law. It is hoped
that this form of presentation will be of assistance to the working
lawyer in the day-to-day problems of cooperatives.
Shortly after the enactment of the Clayton Act, the United States
filed an indictment against the executive committee of the Arroostook
Potato Shippers Association,7 a cooperative, alleging a conspiracy in
restraint of trade under section 1 of the Sherman Act
The claim

was based on the fact that the executive committee had blacklisted
certain potato brokers and others for failure to pay the cooperative's
members and that the executive committee was attempting to enforce
5 Id.

6 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
45, 50 (D.D.C. 1958).
7 United States v. King, 250 F. 908 (D. Mass. 1916).
S Ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
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this blacklisting not only as to its own members, but as to nonmember
potato growers.
In its ruling on a demurrer, the court noted that the indictment
did not contain sufficient information to determine whether the Shippers Association and its executive committee fell within the provisions
of the Clayton Act. The court held, however, that whether or not the
defendant came within the exemption, the coercion of outsiders by a
secondary boycott could not be held a lawful carrying out of the
legitimate objects of the association.9 The court pointed out that it
interpreted the Clayton Act exemptions to prevent breaking up of
agricultural organizations as legal entities, but that those organizations were not thereby privileged to adopt business methods which
are not permitted to other lawful associations.'0
The next significant case to consider the exemptions from antitrust laws of agricultural cooperatives was United States v. Borden
Co." The case arose on an action by the United States charging Borden and Pure Milk Association, an agricultural cooperative, with
engaging in an unlawful combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate commerce in fluid milk in the Chicago area. Specifically,
a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 1 2 was alleged. One issue
in the case concerned whether the exemption for marketing agreements provided in the Agricultural Marketing Act 13 was a defense to
the action. 14 Since no such agreement was in effect as to the defendants that defense was held to be unavailing. After examining CapperVolstead, the Court concluded that the rights of agricultural producers
to unite in preparing for market, in marketing their products, and in
making the contracts necessary for that purpose could not be deemed
to authorize any combination or conspiracy with noncooperatives in
restraint of trade.' 5
The Court went on to hold that the provision of the CapperVolstead Act allowing the Secretary of Agriculture to investigate
whether a cooperative association had created a monopoly situation 16
was not an exclusive means of testing whether a cooperative was 7conspiring to monopolize, and remanded the case to the district court.'
United States v. Dairy Co-operative Association18 was a biting
decision by an Oregon Federal District Court judge. In a preliminary
9 250 F. at 910.

10 Id.

11 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
13 7 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1964).
'4 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 197-203 (1939).
15 Id. at 204-05.
16 7 U.S.C. § 292 (1964).
'7

308 U.S. at 206.

18 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore. 1943).
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ruling on an indictment of a cooperative for violation of the "antitrust acts" the judge commented that he was being asked to "scuttle

the plain language of [section 6 of] the Clayton Act."1 9 He ruled that
a cooperative acting alone and not in concert with others cannot be

prosecuted as a monopoly.20 The opinion does not discuss which section of the antitrust laws was charged, but presumably it was section 2.21 Nor does the decision discuss the Capper-Volstead Act
which might well have been a better ground for the judge's decision.
The Milk ProducersAssociation Series
Beginning in 1949, a series of cases was brought by the United
States against the Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association
and others. In the first of these cases 22 Milk Producers and other noncooperative distributors were indicted for conspiracy to restrain trade
in milk and milk products in violation of section 3 of the Sherman
Act. 23 The Milk Producers Association was a nonstock membership
cooperative. When the trial court dismissed the indictment, based on
the exemptions provided in both the Clayton Act and the CapperVolstead Act, the government appealed directly to the Supreme Court
which remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia. 24 The latter court cited Borden and held that while the
Clayton Act gave some privileges to combinations of agricultural producers, a combination of producers and noncooperative distributors
in the marto eliminate competition and fix prices at successive2 stages
5
keting of an agricultural product was not privileged.
The court of appeals further held that while the Secretary of
Agriculture could enter into marketing agreements, 26 which would
create an exemption from antitrust prosecution, the Secretary had
not done so in this instance; and therefore, since there was no marketalleged, the trial
ing order by the Secretary in the actual situation
27
reversed.
was
indictment
the
of
dismissal
court's
In 1956 two incorporated milk producers' associations were indicted 28 for alleged violations of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act.29
19 Id.
20

Id.

21
22

15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 179 F.2d 426

(D.C. Cir. 1940).
23 15 U.S.C. § 3 (1964).
24

United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 335 U.S. 802

(1948) (per curiam).
25 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 179 F.2d 426,

428 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
26 7 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1964).
27 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 179 F.2d 426,
429 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
28 United States v. Maryland Cooperatives Producers, Inc., 145 F. Supp.
151 (D.D.C. 1956).
29 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1964).
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The court ruled that the exemption of farmer cooperatives from the
antitrust laws granted in section 6 of the Clayton Act applies to combinations of agricultural cooperatives which fix prices for their products if no other persons or organizations not members of such groups
are parts of the combination. 30 The court also held that the provisions of the Capper-Volstead Act were applicable because that act permitted agricultural cooperatives to have marketing agencies in common. A judgment of acquittal was entered by the court after the
government's opening argument. The court distinguished the instant
case from the situation in Bordon 31 because the combination alleged
32
in the earlier case consisted of a cooperative and a noncooperative.
Two years later the Justice Department brought suit for injunctive and other relief against the Association.33 The first cause of action alleged a monopoly in the District of Columbia and certain regions
of Maryland and Virginia in violation of section 2 of the Sherman
Act.3 4 The government also charged a combination and conspiracy in
violation of sections 1 and 3 of the Sherman Act 35 to eliminate and
foreclose competition arising out of defendant cooperatives having
acquired substantially all of the assets of a rental milk outlet in Washington, D.C. A third cause of action was based upon an alleged violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act 36 because defendant had acquired
all of the outstanding stock of two other noncooperative dairy corporations.
The first phase of the case arose on a hearing on the special defenses of the Capper-Volstead Act and section 6 of the Clayton Act
interposed by defendant. The court found that the cooperative consisted of approximately 2,000 milk producers owning or operating
dairies in Maryland and Virginia. Its members delivered milk to the
association which acted as their marketing agency. The members included partnerships and some corporations. In some cases, the ownership was by an absentee landlord or by a nonoperating owner. The
court also found that the defendant did not have capital stock and
was conducted only for the profit of its members. The court37 ruled
that the association met the tests of section 6 of the Clayton Act.
30 United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F.
Supp. 151, 153 (D.D.C. 1956).
31 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
32 United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Producers, Inc., 145 F.
Supp. 151, 153 (D.D.C. 1956).
33 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
45 (D.D.C. 1958).
34 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964).
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1964).
36 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
37

15 U.S.C. § 17 (1964).
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In claiming that the Capper-Volstead exemption was restricted
only to natural persons, the government argued that since many of the
cooperative members were absentees and some were partnerships or
corporations, the exemption was not applicable. The court pointed
out that when Congress decided to utilize a more circumscribed defi8
It found no basis for a renition of a "farmer" it did so expressly.3
stricted definition under the Capper-Volstead Act, saying "[t] he owner
or operator of a dairy is a dairyman, whether he personally works on
his dairy or has the work done by employees. ' 3 9
In ruling that the first cause of action should be dismissed, the
court said that "an agricultural cooperative is entirely exempt from
the provisions of the antitrust laws, both as to its very existence as
well as to all of its activities, provided it does not enter into conspiracies or combinations with persons who are not producers of agricultural commodities." 40
As to the second count, which alleged violations of section 1 and 3
of the Sherman Act, the court held that conspiracy with certain persons
not engaged in agricultural pursuits as defined in the statutes was
alleged and that those allegations were clearly within the exception
to section 6 of the Clayton Act stated in the Borden case. 41 Thereas to the second count was held not
fore, the defendant's special plea 42
to bar the case from going to trial.
The court pointed out that the applicability of section 7 of the
Clayton Act 48 depended upon the jurisdiction over the acquiring corporation by the Federal Trade Commission. The court held that the
Capper-Volstead provisions empowering cooperatives to make necessary contracts and agreements did not exempt them from the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission. Therefore, the Cappernot to be a defense to a violation of section 7
Volstead Act was held
44
of the Clayton Act.
The court's decision after trial of the second and third causes of
action 45 adds little to the specific field of cooperative antitrust law
since the court had earlier ruled on the special defenses. However,
88

(1964).

See, e.g., the definition used in the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 1(17)

89 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
45, 49 (D.D.C. 1958).
40 Id. at 52.
41 United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
42 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45,
53 (D.D.C. 1958).
43 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
44 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45,
53 (D.D.C. 1958).
45 This decision is reported in United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1958).
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the court did find that the acquisition of the assets of a dairy company
as charged in the second cause of action cut off a market for milk for
many independent milk producers who had supplied the former dairy
unless those producers were willing to join defendant cooperative.
Regarding the acquisition of the corporate stock of two other dairies
acquired by defendant, the court ruled that they were hopelessly insolvent and that the acquisition of them was not a violation of the
46
Clayton Act.
47
The government then sought and obtained a separate decision
as to whether such acquisition further violated the Sherman Act.
The cooperative argued that the immunity provided by the CapperVolstead Act should not be denied in a transaction between a cooperative and a noncooperative where the advantage lay with the noncooperative. The court could not find any authoritative basis for such
a distinction and ruled that the acquisition of the assets of the dairy
48
was in violation of the Sherman Act.
It will be recalled that the trial court had dismissed the first cause
of action which alleged a monopoly in the District of Columbia and
certain regions of Maryland and Virginia in violation of section 2 of
the Sherman Act.49 After trial the court found that the acquisition of
the assets of a formerly competing dairy violated section 7 of the
Clayton Act and that acquisition of the capital stock of two insolvent
competitors did not violate that section. 50 Then in a separate decision, the district court ruled that the acquisition of the assets of a
formerly competing dairy also violated the Sherman Act.51 Both
parties appealed from all or a portion of the three district court deci2
sions.5
The Supreme Court had little difficulty sustaining the trial court's
various decisions on the second and third causes of action. As to the
first cause of action, however, the Court held that the statement of
particular charges of anticompetitive activities were so far outside the
legitimate objects of a cooperative that, if proved, they would consti58
tute clear violations of section 2 of the Sherman Act.
46
47

Id. at 809.

United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 168 F. Supp.
880 (D.D.C. 1959).
48 Id. at 881.
49 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45
(D.D.C. 1958).
50 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp.
799 (D.D.C. 1958).
53 United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 168 F. Supp.
880 (D.D.C. 1959).
52 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
53 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458,
468 (1960).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[VOL 19

The decision notes testimony of the Secretary of Agriculture and
the Solicitor of the Department of Agriculture at the hearings on
the Capper-Volstead Act prior to its passage. They had both said
that Capper-Volstead, if passed, would not authorize predatory practices in violation of the Sherman Act.54 The Court ruled that the
privileges of Capper-Volstead granted to producers the right to conduct their affairs collectively, but did not allow a combination with
competitors to create a monopoly position as a lever further to
suppress competition by and among independent producers and processors. 55
The portion of the Borden case holding section 2 of the CapperVolstead Act not to be the exclusive means of determining cooperative monopolies, was reaffirmed. 56 The Court noted that, based on
all the evidence, there seemed to be a pattern of unlawful conduct
under the Sherman Act and not a contract merely to advance the asso7
It
ciation's own permissible processing and marketing business.
was held, therefore, that the district court had improperly dismissed
the first cause of action, and the case was remanded for trial insofar
as the first count was concerned.
April v. National Cranberry Association5s is noteworthy for its
analysis of the above cases. A treble damage suit was filed against
the association, two of its members, and several directors. Defendants were charged with violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act. 59 On their motion for summary judgment, the court ruled:
[I] hold that when Capper-Volstead provided that a cooperative
and its members were not to be prohibited from "lawfully carrying
out the legitimate objects thereof ... ." (to use the language of section 6 of the Clayton Act), at least it did not make lawful purely
predatory practices seeking to monopolize, forbidden to an individual
corporation, nor did it deprive the victims.., of their private right of
action .... 60

The court criticized the portion of the opinion in United States v.
Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association61 in which the
district court had held that an agricultural cooperative is entirely
exempt from the antitrust laws, both as to its existence and its operations. 62 The court, in a footnote, was additionally critical of the Milk
Producers opinion where it was held that a cooperative was not sub54 Id. at 458 n.16.
55 Id.at 467.
56 Id. at 462.
57 Id. at 472.
5s8168 F. Supp. 919 (D.Mass. 1958).
59 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1964).
60 April v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919, 923 (D.Mass. 1958).
61 United States v. Maryland &Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45,
50 (D.D.C. 1958).
62 April v. Nat'l Cranberry Ass'n, 168 F. Supp. 919, 921 (D.Mass. 1958).
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3
ject to suit by a private person for antitrust violations.
The court indicated that the case should go to trial on the cause
a monopoly,
of action based on section 2 of the Sherman Act, charging
4
rather than some theory of a conspiracy under section 1.1

The Sunkist Series
Sunkist Growers, a large southern California based cooperative
dealing in citrus fruits, has been the subject of the most recent cases
in the field of cooperative antitrust law. Sunkist is indirectly composed of more than 12,000 growers of citrus fruits in California and
Arizona. Growers are organized into local associations which operate
packing houses. The associations, in turn, are grouped into district
exchanges, and representatives from these exchanges make up the
governing board of Sunkist. It is a nonstock membership association
which markets its members' fresh fruit and fruit products through
field, advertising, sales, and traffic departments. In 1915 and 1916,
Sunkist caused the formation of two other nonprofit corporations.
The first was Exchange Lemon. It was a stock association composed
of lemon grower associations which were also members of Sunkist.
Its function was primarily one of processing and the resulting citrus
products were marketed through Sunkist's products department,
jointly managed by the directors of Exchange Lemon and the second
affiliate, Exchange Orange.
Exchange Orange was organized as a nonstock membership corporation one year after Exchange Lemon. It was comprised of a number of Sunkist's member associations and was operated as a subsidiary
of Sunkist. Its purpose was to develop byproducts for oranges.
In Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Products
Co. 65 the jury trial resulted in an award of $500,000 trebled to $1,500,000.66 Winckler and Smith Citrus Products had brought suit against
Sunkist, Exchange Orange, and Exchange Lemon claiming that those
organizations had conspired to restrain and monopolize interstate
trade and commerce in the processing and sale of citrus fruit juice.
The appellate court made an exhaustive examination of the instructions given to the jury. Among other instructions were some which
implied that Sunkist and its two subsidiaries could have conspired..
The court ruled that these instructions were proper and upheld the
judgment as to liability.67 The evidence with regard to damage was
too speculative and uncertain, however, and the court overturned that
63 Id. at 921 n.2.
64 Id. at 923.
65 284 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1960).
66 Id. at 4.
67

Id. at 22, 26.
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portion of the judgment. 68 The court stated that it had withheld its
decision pending the Supreme Court's decision in the Maryland &
VirginiaMilk Producers case. 69
The Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the issue of the
immunity of interorganizational dealings among the three cooperatives from the conspiracy provisions of the antitrust laws.7 0 The
basis for the appeal by Sunkist was the trial court's instructions which
had at several points referred to the possibility of a conspiracy between Sunkist, Exchange Orange and Exchange Lemon.
The Court considered the immunities conferred by both the Capper-Volstead Act and the Clayton Act. The Court reasoned that the
12,000 or more citrus growers could combine into one organization for
the collective processing and marketing of their fruit and fruit products without the business decisions of their officers being held a combination or conspiracies:
[W]e feel that the 12,000 growers here involved are in practical effect
and in the contemplation of these statutes one "organization" or "association" even though they have formally organized themselves into
three separate legal entities .... There is no indication that the use
of separate corporations had economic significance in itself or that
outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities as independent
organizations. That the packing is done by local associations, the
advertising, sales, and traffic by divisions of the area association,
and the processing by separate organizations does not in our opinion
preclude these growers from being considered one organization or
for the purposes of the Clayton and Capper-Volstead
association
Acts. 71

The Court in closing cautioned that its decision in no way detracted from the earlier cases holding agricultural cooperatives liable
for conspiracies with outside groups, citing United States v. Borden
Co.7 2 and Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association v. United

States. 73 The case was remanded for trial and died for failure to
prosecute.74
The stakes were too high for Winckler to have eliminated all hope
of successful antitrust charges against Sunkist. Case-Swayne, a processor of citrus products, filed an action for treble damages claiming
monopoly of and attempt to monopolize the citrus products field in
southern California and Arizona.7 5
68 Id. at 34.

69 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
70 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19 (1962).
71 Id. at 29.
72 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
73

362 U.S. 458 (1960).

74 Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 346 F.2d
1012 (9th Cir. 1965).
75 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1967).
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The trial court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict
at the close of the plaintiff's case basing its decision on the finding that
the Capper-Volstead Act provided immunity from the acts charged to
Sunkist.7 6 The appellate court ruled that the district court had correctly determined that Sunkist was a cooperative organized in compliance with section 1 of the Capper-Volstead Act.7 7 The court agreed
with appellant that the issue of whether Sunkist was organized in
compliance with Capper-Volstead had not been specifically raised in
Winckler, but pointed out that the Supreme Court in Winckler did
describe the Sunkist organization in detail.78 It noted that the Supreme Court had concluded that the 12,000 growers were "in practical
effect and in the contemplation of the statutes one 'organization' or
'association' even though.., formally organized ... into three separate legal entities. ' 79 The Case-Swayne court noted that the legislative history of the Capper-Volstead Act revealed several references
to the Sunkist organization-then called California Fruit Growers
Exchange.80 It further found a suggestion by Senator Capper that
this was a type of cooperative that would find "definite legalization"
under the legislation.81
With respect to appellant's contention that Sunkist was not a
qualified cooperative under Capper-Volstead by reason of the fact that
5 percent of its members were corporate growers, the court referred
to United States v. Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers Association.82 In that case, the government had urged that the words "dairymen" and "farmers" should be restricted to natural persons, but the
district court held that it was immaterial whether every member of
the association was a natural person or a corporation. 83 The Supreme
Court in its decision 84 did not comment specifically on the district
court's opinion as to the propriety of corporate members. The court
of appeals reasoned that it seemed likely that this fact would have
been considered by the Supreme Court if there were any questions regarding the status of the association as a qualified cooperative by reason of the membership of corporate growers. 85 The court then stated:
"We find nothing in the context of the Capper-Volstead Act to indicate
76
77
78
79

Id. at 451.
Id. at 461.
Id. at 460.
Id., citing Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co.,

370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962).

so Id. at 460.
81 370 U.S. at 28.
82

167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C. 1958).

83Id.at 49.

84 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458
(1960).
85 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 461 (9th Cir.
1967).
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that a corporation would not be considered a person within the mean' 86
ing of the Act.
Consideration was given to the status of "agency associations"-private profit-making businesses which purchased citrus fruit from
grower-members and sold through Sunkist's marketing facilities.
These associations made up about 15 percent of Sunkist's membership.
The court found that they supplied legitimate services to Sunkist
members and that their separate existence did not preclude the growers from being considered one association for the purposes of the
Capper-Volstead Act.
The court distinguished the Borden case.8 7 It pointed out that
the instant case was not one where by agreement the association had
gone beyond the legitimate objects of processing and marketing its
members' products. The ruling quoted from Borden and from the
Capper-Volstead Act, recognizing the right of agricultural producers
to unite in preparing for market, in marketing their products, 8 and in
making the contracts which are necessary for those purposes.8 9 The
court further cautioned that a cooperative was not authorized to conspire with others in restraint of trade. 90
The appellate court then sustained the trial court's decision as to
the charges by appellant under section 1 of the Sherman Act 91 but
ruled that appellant could properly bring suit under section 2.92
Both sides have appealed and the United States Supreme Court
has granted certiorari. 9 [See Addendum.]
The Government Position
The attitude of the government in cooperative antitrust matters
was most recently expressed-at least publicly-in a talk given by
Donald F. Turner, Assistant Attorney General, in charge of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to the National Conference
of Fruit and Vegetable Bargaining Cooperatives in Washington, D.C.,
on January 17, 1966.94 Mr. Turner made two general points:
Id.
United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188 (1939).
88 Capper-Volstead Act § 1, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1964).
89 Id.
90 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 461 (9th Cir.
1967).
91 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
92 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449, 458 (9th Cir.
1967).
93 387 U.S. 903 (1967).
94 Reprinted in THE CooPERATIVE ACCOUNTANT, Summer 1966, at 22.
86

87
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First, farmers and producers may form cooperatives without violating the antitrust laws, but once formed, cooperatives should, by
and large, be treated like other businesses under the antitrust laws;
second, membership in cooperatives must remain voluntary. 5
After reciting statistics as to the growth of cooperatives and the
increased volume of business handled by them, he said that he did
not mean to imply that the present development of agricultural cooperatives had reached a point where monopoly had become a serious
problem. He stated, however, that agricultural cooperatives are no
longer a negligible factor in our nation's economic life. As cooperatives grow in size and importance, he said, they assume more and
more of the characteristics of large corporate businesses, and it becomes even more important that our competitive policy be applied to
private businesses and to cooperative businesses without discrimination. 6 Many of the conclusions reached by Mr. Turner were based
on the cases reviewed in this article. He anticipated the court's decision in Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc.,97 which subsequently held that a cooperative or affiliated group of cooperatives
was not subject to the provisions of section 1 of the Sherman Act forbidding contracts, combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade
or commerce, but held that such a cooperative or affiliated group
might be held to be a monopoly under section 2.98
The speaker referred to the Maryland & Virginia Milk Producers case.9 9 He stated that this case suggests that while a cooperative merger with a noncooperative is subject to the antitrust laws, a
merger of two cooperatives could not, of itself, be a violation because
of the Clayton-Volstead Act exemptions.
Of more than passing note is Mr. Turner's insistence on voluntary
membership in cooperatives and the right of the member to withdraw at any time. After reviewing the interaction of supply and
cost, he stated:
[A]n individual farmer may believe with good reason that he can
make more money by quitting the cooperative, by producing all he desires and by selling his product at a price just slightly below that
charged by the cooperative. The fact that such farmers are free to
leave the association will thus tend to drive the price of the produce
down toward the competitive level.
There are, therefore, good reasons for insisting that membership
in a cooperative remain voluntary, and for refusing to let a cooperative coerce outsiders by depriving them of access to markets. 0 0
95
96

Id.
Id.

97

369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1967).

98

Id.

99 362 U.S. 458 (1960).
100 Address by Donald F. Turner, supra note 94, at 24-25.
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The Deputy U.S. Attorney then attempted to distinguish between
agricultural organizations and labor unions. As to the latter, he
found that individual bargaining was an impossibility but that insofar
as the agricultural producer was concerned, his problems were much
more simple. He was undeterred by the fact that section 6 of the
Clayton Act includes labor, agricultural and horticultural organizations
without distinction.
His statements go to the very heart of the cooperative movement.

The necessity for producers of an agricultural product to present a
united front has been discussed elsewhere.10 1

Section 54261 of the

Agricultural Code of California gives a cooperative the right to enter
into long term contracts with its members whereby they are required
to deliver their agricultural products to or through the agricultural
association. Section 54264 provides that the cooperative may obtain
liquidated damages for breach of the marketing contract; and section
53265 provides for injunctive relief on behalf of this cooperative.
Similar2 provisions are found in the cooperative laws of almost every
state.

0

With the courts already questioning and limiting the cooperative's
exemption from antitrust law, does Mr. Turner's talk presage an
attack upon cooperatives for monopolizing by enforcement of their
marketing contracts? If so, this could be the unkindest cut of all.
Conclusion
The present state of the law seems to be as follows:
(1) The mere existence of an agricultural cooperative does not
03
violate the antitrust laws.
(2) It would appear that two or more cooperatives could merge
and that such mergers would be protected by the Capper-Volstead Act
10 4
from charges of antitrust violation.
(3) Where separate cooperative entities formed by the same
producers are actually operated as one organization, the separate
entities will not be held to have conspired between each other in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. 10 5
(4) Cooperatives will not lose their Capper-Volstead and Clay101 CALIFORNIA FAmvr

AND RANCH LAW

397 (Cal. Cont. Educ. Bar ed. 1967);

Ela, Cooperatives under the Law, in CooPERATiVE CoRPoRATIoN AssocIATioN

LAw-1950, at 517 (150).
102 Jensen, supra note 2, at 11.
103 United States v. Dairy Co-operative Ass'n, 49 F. Supp. 475 (D. Ore.
1943).
104 Address by Donald F. Turner, supra note 94.
105 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19 (1962); Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1967).
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ton Act exemptions because they are composed of member associations, 06 because they have corporate members, 0 7 or because they
have some nonproducer members.' 0 8 [But see Addendum.]
(5) The Capper-Volstead and Clayton Act exemptions do not
protect a cooperative from charges of monopolization under section
2 of the Sherman Act. 0 9
(6) The Capper-Volstead Act does not protect a cooperative from
charges under section 7 of the Clayton Act" 0 forbidding the acquiring
of the stock or assets of a corporation which will lessen competition or
tend to create a monopoly, nor from charges of violations of sections 1
and 3 of the Sherman Act for acquiring the assets of a competitor.",
(7) A cooperative may not use its2 authority over members to
enforce a boycott against nonmembers."
(8) A cooperative may run afoul of the antitrust division if it
enforces its marketing contracts with members." 3
(9) If producers of agricultural commodities are denied a
they join an association, that association may be in for
market unless
4
trouble."
Addendum
On December 18, 1967, the Supreme Court rendered its decision
5
In a decision delivin Case-Swayne, Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc."
ered by Justice Marshall, the Court denied Sunkist's exemption under
the Capper-Volstead Act from the conspiracy charges under section
1 of the Sherman Act, because about 15 percent of its members were
nongrower private corporations and partnerships, owning and operating packing houses for profit." 6
7
as (1) Congress inSunkist's arguments were summarized"
the grower benewhich
by
form
tended to protect any organizational
106 Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S.
19 (1962).
107 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1967);
United States v. Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 167 F. Supp. 45 (D.D.C.
1958).
.08 Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 369 F.2d 449 (9th Cir.
1967).
109 Id.
110 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
111 Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458

(1960).
112

"13
"34

United States v. King, 250 F. 908 (D. Mass. 1916).
Address by Donald F. Turner, supra note 94.
Maryland & Va. Milk Producers Ass'n v. United States, 362 U.S. 458

(1960).
2 CCH 1967 Sup. CT. BuLL. B 485.
116 Id. at B 487. See page 342 supra.
"15

"17

Id. at B 491.
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fited from collective marketing; (2) the nongrower members did not
participate directly in the gain or loss of operations; (3) nongrower
members' rights to vote and receive dividends were strictly limited;
and (4) nongrower membership had no economic significance.
As to the first two arguments, the Court held that these misconceived the Capper-Volstead Act and ran counter to its legislative history.11 8 The Court found sufficient capital participation by nongrowers to eliminate point three." 9 Antitrust implications between
a cooperative and others were held not to be governed by "economic
significance.' 1 20 The Court concluded, "We think Congress did not
intend to allow an organization with such nonproducer interests to
avail itself of the Capper-Volstead exemption."' 21 The opinion was
limited to a decision that Sunkist was not entitled to assert CapperVolstead as a defense, and expressed no views on the merits of the
suit.1 22 The case was reversed and remanded.
A concurring opinion2 3 by Justices White and Stewart argued
that Sunkist should not lose its antitrust immunity completely, but
only as to the transactions which fall outside of the Capper-Volstead
1 24
protection.
Justice Harlan concurred in part, and dissented in part.125 He
argued against an ex post facto application of the majority decision
because of Sunkist's bona fide reasons for the nongrower memberships. He recommended that on remand the case be limited to CaseSwayne's showing what, if any, damages were suffered by it from
benefit as
actions taken by the nongrower members for their own
20
distinguished from the benefit of the grower members.1
Justice Douglas filed a "dubitante" opinion, in which he stated
that the extent of the loss of immunity had not been argued before
the Court and urged that the scope of the immunity that might sur1 27
vive be reserved.
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